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A National and a Democratic Logic
Etienne Balibar has suggested that every national political project presupposes an ethnicity, that 
is, a certain substance that inheres in its subjects and renders them commensurate. At the 
moment, therefore, when even a democratic project becomes a national project it is driven to 
imagine an essential quality that binds these individuals in this place at such and such a time in 
relations o f equivalence What will be explored in this paper is exactly the substance, the national 
ether, presupposed by the democratic project in South Africa. At stake is the ethnic quality o f the 
South African citizen. Now, this may seem an unusual formulation; if not a thoroughly dubious 
assertion The ‘rainbow’ nation is so blatantly not an ethnic nation, one could respond. The 
constitution, for example, recognises 11 official languages and is formally premised on non­
racialism. It grants, moreover, equality to women and even lesbians and homosexuals Indeed, its 
only standard is that of the universal subject, the bearer o f fundamental human rights The 
boundary o f the nation, furthermore, is not deemed to enclose a peculiar racial, ethnic or 
linguistic group but is merely that historical artifact inherited from colonialism that has become 
sedimented for whatever contingent reason.
But let us dwell a little on the figure of the citizen. Despite its historical designation as simply a 
member o f a political community (be it a monarchy, aristocracy, a despotic regime or a 
democracy), the term citizen today has a preeminent signification as the subject of the 
democratic community. It is the democratic subject par excellence. Modern political theory 
understands by this term a political subject bearing civic rights (equality before the law, personal 
liberty, the freedom of speech, of belief o f opinion, the right to property and the rights to 
contract with another), political rights (right to elect and to be elected and the right to participate 
in government) and even socio-economic rights (equal access to health care and the regulation of 
work), where these rights are deemed to announce themselves from human nature.' At first 
glance, therefore, a project appealing to citizenship is driven merely to give expression to a 
nature always already given But we are confronted with our first difficulty when we ask who is 
a citizen? Or rather, who is not? Whose fundamental human rights, that is, are recognised in the 
national community? The moment the Citizen (the universal bearer o f rights) becomes a citizen 
(the bearer o f rights in a national community) she is necessarily marked with a distinctive quality 
that distinguishes her from other citizens; a something, in other words, that makes her rights 
admissible in this or that community . Our second difficulty arises when we ask if these rights 
apply to the mad and the mentally handicapped. Living apart and judged incapable of 
autonomously expressing their opinions they are said only to have partial political rights. Marie 
Gaille concludes, therefore:
"This makes one suspect tlial citizenship is not granted lo this or dial individual on the basis of the rights of man,
but, rather, as a status conferred according lo relative criteria | .. |.”
' Ccla fait iiaitre le soiip(on quc la ciloyennete n’csl pas altribiicc a Id  ou tel individu en venu dc drolls dc 
I’homme, mais plutol coiiiiiic im sialul coofere en fonclion de crileres relatirs I )^ ”
Now, if citizenship is a status and not a right, then it implies duties and obligations issued not 
from nature, but from the political community itself Even when judged a feature of birth it only 
reveals itself in relations between people and the State Rights only appear, that is, in the light of 
the sovereign law. Hence the disassociation possible between the ‘natural rights o f Man’ and the 
civic and especially political rights of the citizen To the extent, therefore, that rights are 
conferred by tbe law they can be granted in degrees and they are susceptible to political claims 
by those who do not enjoy them Citizenship is thus produced in the relations between 
individuals or collectivities and the State
We can ask, therefore, without being absurd who is not a citizen? Let me give precision to this 
question to avoid any misunderstanding; for the misrecognition of its object will lead us away 
from the problem that I want to declare 1 am not so much interested in the criteria governing 
admission to the community, than 1 am with the quality governing the production of the national 
citizen in the first place But I do not mean by this phrase who is entitled to what rights. In asking 
who is not a citizen it does nol follow that one refers to a bill o f human rights and then studies 
how class or gender or culture or sickness impedes their exercise. Nor does it follow that one 
further interrogates social relations to determine which is and which is not a fundamental right 
Such an approach would take as given the very thing I want to problematise. In asking who is a 
citizen, I intend, who lives within the social; or better, who lives wilhin the nation?
The citizen is not simply an individual admitted to the political community, but a figure 
proUticeJ through the sovereignty of the law She appears, that is, at the moment she is granted 
certain rights by the State and exercises or makes claims against it. We can say, therefore, that 
the citizen appears when the State establishes itself as the embodiment o f the law in a particular 
territory But conceived as a production or an appearance we can see that the citizen has 
conditions of being that are not the conditions of nature Its conditions are the conditions of state 
sovereignty.
Now, sovereignty is not established by an act, is not a declaration of independence, it is not even 
the capture o f state power; it is a system of material practices that establish the hegemony in a 
national territory of state apparatuses It is that process o f hailing and instituting individuals into 
relations that are comprehensible to these institutions. If we ask, then, who is a citizen, we can 
say schematically, that it is an individual rendered comprehensible to the state.
We can thus distinguish between two essential features of a nalional citizen. On the one hand she 
is similar to the.w citizens and unlike those. On the other hand, she has rights granted according 
to a standard that is properly-speaking social 1 will describe these qualities separately as a fictive 
ethnicity and a fictive sociability. Despite their apparent similarity (is the community of citizens 
not simply the community of nationals?) they govern distinct boundaries; or more precisely, they 
govern distinct axes. A fictive ethnicity designates a horizontal relationship that is both 
segmented and serial It refers to some or other property, essential and durable (“you can take the 
Frenchman out of France but you cannot take France out of the Frenchman”), that inheres in 
certain individuals and distinguishes them from others It also refers to a substance both 
contingent (the French-ness o f a Frenchman) and universal (while Frenchman x is different from 
a German xy are both simultaneously national beings). We can discuss, therefore, a ubiquitous 
national attribute. 1 will call it a national Ethnicity In contrast, sociability refers to vertical 
relations between members of the community; its hierarchies, orders, grades and ranks In the 
case of citizenship this social architecture is deemed, or is seen to be produced, not by God, nor a
divine-like force, but by the relationship between social groups themselves; that is, within the 
social Now the articulation of a national logic and a citizen logic (as a peculiar fictive 
sociability) implies a very curious production of the political community indeed We can say, 
veiy schematically for the moment, that it is a ‘people’ that produces itself! The essential and 
identical property deemed inherent in national subjects (their fictive ethnicity) is itself produced 
by them' Theirs is properly-speaking an historical society, propelled by its original tautology; 
the imperative to continually produce the very thing (national citizens) that it is produced by 
(national citizens). This is how 1 suggest we should understand Thabo Mbeki’s call for a national 
debate about Transformation. It is a move to define a South African fictive ethnicity for and by 
South African citizens.
Now, from outside this tautology; outside the ‘national question’ that is, the limits o f the 
democratic project in South Africa are discernible; and in particular its necessary blind-spots. It 
y  is incapable of coming to terms with customary practices. I do not simply mean by this that 
customary authorities cannot be ‘thought’ in the nation; that their powers and functions, their 
relationship to the state cannot be formulated etc. With some difficulty they can be. This is the 
object o f legal attempts to producing a working relationship between customary law and civil 
law Or current attempts to define a limited role for traditional authorities in rural local 
governments’ . These approaches are firmly grasped by the tautology discussed above; they are 
driven to conceive customary subjects in the very terms that are inadmissible in their context: as 
national citizens produced in the sovereign light o f the national state. Now, at stake is not simply 
customary institutions, but the subjects hailed by them. They are produced not in the light of the 
national state, but in the sometimes bright, sometimes flickering glow of customary institutions.
The current debate about customary authorities, as manifest in the handful o f policy documents 
concerning them, treats these institutions as essentially uniform, uniformly robust and resilient, 
that is. What this conceals is their highly varied nature in terms both o f their de facto 
competencies and the reach of their authority. New legislation, as previewed in the white papers 
on rural local government and municipal infrastructure, runs the risk, therefore, o f overestimating 
their importance in some places and according to some a role that may serve merely to sediment 
a weak or withering institution. Now, by reducing the ‘problem’ that ‘traditional’ authorities 
represent, as do the white papers on rural local government and municipal infrastructure, to one 
of institutional cooperation, cohabitation, powers and functions between them and state 
structures, what is overlooked are their effects. These institutions produce subjects, not according 
to the figure o f the national subject, not invested with a national Ethnicity, but according to what 
I will discuss as a messianic figure; a subject hailed according to another mode-of-being in the 
world. The extent to which traditional institutions are compatible with elected government 
depends merely on the degree to which they are patriarchal or democratic. This is not a new 
observation, and in this respect Mamdani, for example, merely serves to remind us o f something 
Marx had long known But this changes not the fact that whether their internal organisation is 
more or less patriarchal they in no way hail national .subjects] Now, once we lower our gaze 
from the level o f the institution to the subjects produced by them we can notice that the question 
is much larger than mere institutional compatibility (or not). What South African and other 
historical scholarship has stressed over the last two decades and, moreover, what informed the 
politics o f the tri-partite alliance (the ANC, the SACP and COSATU) is that the customary 
system in South Africa is, by nature, deterritorialised We need not re-invent the wheel to state 
that the system o f migrant labour functioned to displace customary subjects beyond the
' We are in the presence of a truly mysterious coiiimuiiily, a fantomythic assembly, haunted by a pantheon of 
spirits and ghosts, archetypes and specimens -  a community that must imagine its own consistance, must 
produce its distinctive somelliing ; the fanlasmic blood of the Gennan,
jurisdictions o f their chiefs and kings Treating, therefore, the central question o f ‘traditional’ 
authorities as one concerning the institutional relationship between them and state apparatuses 
conceals the presence, sometimes scattered, but sometimes organised, o f subjects being-in-the- 
world-differently within the jurisdiction of state apparatus Now, let me be precise about what 1 
mean here by a customary subject. 1 do not necessarily refer to those subjects still obedient to a 
certain chiefly hierarchy, but rather those persons that represent and live their relationship to 
others and to the state according to messianic time. A customary subject is one that has been 
interpellated into a certain mode of being that is incomprehensible to the national state. We will 
find that the force o f the contradiction between the customary ‘system’ and the national state is 
not essentially produced in the political about the political (about, that is, the respective roles and 
powers and function of traditional bodies and local governments ) but in the interstices o f the 
political and the social In other words, the force of the contradiction is manifest in the capacity 
of the state to govern At stake is the establishment of state sovereignty. Or, rather, o f producing"^ 
all South Africans in the light of the national state. Hence, a more urgent question for the 
national state than the role of authorities next to or within state structures, is their capacity to hold 
and interpellate their subjects in non-messianic relations.
We will see that the Ethnicity of a national subject, is not simply an identity, a certain 
representation of their things-in-common with others ‘like’ them, but is that quality permitting 
such a representation in the first place The nation is a society, par excellence, o f individuals. But 
I have something very precise here in mind. I do not refer here to a biological category, or even a 
homo oeconomicus, or a homo rationalis, but to a subject that automates herself according to that 
spatial and temporal matrix that Walter Benjamin called ‘homogenous time’. The condition of 
state sovereignty, or more accurately of the sovereignty o f the nation state, is the insertion of 
people into a host of relations (spatial, familial and bureaucratic) that capture them in 
homogenous time, that make of them, in other words, individuals.
The substance that 1 will propose is lacking in customary subjects, therefore, is exactly this 
spatio-temporal matter, this certain mode-of-being-individuals that makes them governable by 
the national state Or put differently, what is lacking in customary subjects is their insertion into a 
host of material structures that would make of them individuals; beings in homogenous time.. 
The customary subject is hailed into a space-time matrix that manifests as a different relationship 
to power, to space and to time The contradiction between the customary subject and the national 
state manifests most acutely at precisely the moment when the latter tries to govern. For what is 
at stake in these operations, what we can call ‘development’, is precisely the capture of people to 
homogenous time; is the insertion of subjects in relations that transform or reproduce them 
individuals
The customary subject, moreover, is not simply another national subject -  that would make the 
conflicts in South Africa equivalent to those in Northern Island (an Irish subject vs a British 
subject), Spain (a Catalan or a Basque subject vs a Spanish subject) or Turkey (a Kurdish subject 
vs a Turkish subject). In only one case, and only during a short while during the early 1990’s, 
was a customary subject nearly appropriated to nationalism' It is precisely their formal 
willingness to be South African national subjects that has enabled the state to avoid a secessionist 
war (only just!) and, moreover, permitted traditional institutions to find partial recognition in the
' We should note Uic speech of King Goodwill Zwelilhini, King of the Zulus, dated 14 of February 1994 : «lf lire 
Zulu nalion caimol co-e.\isl witli tire other societies in a luiiled Soulh Africa, it will become necessary artd 
unavoidable tirat the Zulu nalion lives indepcndrmlly in its owrt lartd artd with its own govermuetti | .. | » (cited in 
Polunic, J (1998) KwaZulu, Natal. KwaZulu-Natal: Idcnliles ou iderrlite d’uite nouvelle province Sud- 
Africaine ?’ in Geographie et ( 'ultulres : I 'Afrique itu Suit recoposec. No. 28. Iriver. L’Harmattart : Paris.
South African constitution"' They rarely demand political sovereignty in their own national 
territory; or more precisely, from a climax in 1994 such claims have progressively diminished. In 
other words, and despite appearances, the contradiction between customary and national subjects 
is not about competing versions of Active ethnicity If we consider quickly the competing images 
of the South African ‘people’, competing notions of South African Active ethnicity, we will see 
that even when customary subjects are apparently accommodated in this image is not enough to 
make of them authentic national subjects.
1. Building the South African Nation
/. / The limit o f Incarnation
1 And useAil the suggestion of Pierre Rosanvallon that the democratic imperative implies 
simultaneously “the definition of a regime of authority and a subject exercising it” [“la dtfmition 
d’un regime d’autorite et d’un sujet l’exer9ant”], where the principle o f popular rule -  power to 
the “people” - is subject to a double indetermination concerning the incarnation of the “people” 
as a sociological entity and the political-institutional means to give expression to its voice’.
"In making tlie will sacred against the natural order or against Iiisloiy, modem politics grants power to the people
at the moment the emancipator^' project driven by it leads in a parallel way to render the social abstract*” limc|'
The illegibility o f the social, for a democratic project, arises from the egalitarian principle that 
reduces each individual to a rights-bearing subject and a citizen outside her historical and 
sociological existence
All their differences and their distinctions |of individuals|must be placed at a distance only to consider them in
their cormnon and essential quality: that of the autonomous subject’” (imc)''.
The republican enterprise thus empties the “people” of its concrete social content 
(class/gender/cultural differences), of its sociological consistence, to render it a purely abstract 
quantity of individuals. Rosanvallon discusses the history of representation in France as 
Auctuating between moves to give sociological content to the French “people”, on the one hand, 
to represent them, that is, in their concrete social conditions, or, on the other, to incarnate this 
purely abstract body of autonomous subjects He reminds us, moreover, that this produced a 
“cacophony” of typologies claiming to describe the essential (and hence representable) 
categories o f the French social and/or an array of descriptions (and hence practices) o f this 
individual shorn from her historical and sociological specificity: a universal republican Agure 
We can say, alternatively, that the republican project vacillates between competing (ethnic) 
figures o f the citizen; competing conceptions of the peculiar social consistency of the social or 
images o f the national subject These are the terms in which the “nation-building” project in 
South Africa is cast: to capture and represent the ‘nation’ in its concrete sociology and/or to 
institute a South African individual In this regard, a major shiA has occurred and is occurring in 
the state conception of the South African “nation”
' “Ell sacralisaiil la volonlc coiilre I'ordre de la iialiirc ou dc I’liisloirc, la politique modeme confie au people le 
poiivoir au moment oil le projet d emancipation qu elle veliicule conduit parall6lcmenl d abstractiscr le social ’
" "Toutes leurs differences (dcs indi\ idns| cl leurs distinctions doivent elre mises d distance pour nc plus les 
considcrer que dans leur commune cl cssenliellc qiialild: cclle de sujet autonomc”.
If during the 1980’s the answer to who were the South African “people” was given, in the 
preeminent political discourse of the ANC alliance, by the theory o f National Democratic 
Revolution, the decline of a politics informed by Marxism-Leninism during the 1990’s has seen 
the “people” defined more and more abstractly via the notion o f the individual, coupled 
ambiguously and uneasily with ideas inherited from African Nationalism. Although NDR 
stressed the primarily working-class character of the “nationally oppressed”, following Lenin in 
Imperialism: the highest stage o f capitalism, it did not reduce the one to the other. Here it was 
argued that South African workers were not simply exploited as a proletariat, but were 
simultaneously dominated as a people. It was precisely the national character o f colonial power 
that made possible a (ultimately temporary') class alliance between workers and other colonised 
classes -  this that gave the anti-apartheid struggle the form of a national struggle. Indeed, it was 
this reading o f the South African political-economy that formed the basis o f the alliance between 
the ANC, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and, in the 1980’s, the Congress o f South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU). The “people” thus seeking political freedom in a democratic 
state form where those national-democratic subjects oppressed and exploited by a racial- 
capitalism
When the ANC won power in the historic election of 1994, the theory of NDR found expression 
in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). Premised on a profound suspicion of 
South African capitalism (as the author of oppression and exploitation) the RDP envisaged a 
programme of state-driven social investment to remedy the massive inequalities (what were 
called euphemistically “backlogs”) in housing, infrastructure, services, education, health and so 
on between “white” and “black” South Africans. The programme foresaw, as one o f its key 
principles, a national process of popular governance where development priorities for each tier of 
government (chiefly regional and local) were to be determined in local assemblies (Community 
Development Forums and Local Development Forums) that would give expression to the 
“people’s” will Not wanting to preempt an argument that will develop in the course of this 
paper, 1 will not discuss here the reasons for the eclipse of the RDP. We can note merely that in 
1996 it was replaced by the Growth, Equity and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy as the 
cornerstone of government policy. What is important to observe is the remarkable and 
fundamental shift that GEAR represents, and the consequences it implies for who today is 
considered the South African “people” First and foremost the GEAR policy effectively acquits 
South African capitalism of charges of reproducing racial inequality in its structure, by premising 
social redress on a vigorous and energetic expansion of the private sector and the market 
Contemporary government policy thus stresses economic growth, and the growth of the capitalist 
sector in particular, as the condition of meeting former RDP social targets. 0^^
If political freedom and popular sovereignty, as envisaged by the politics o f national democratic ^  
revolution, translated not simply into “one man (sic) one vote”, but into the “nationalisation of 
the commanding heights of the economy” so that the “wealth of the country be shared by all”, 
GEAR, while sometimes retaining the metaphors and language of NDR, reinvests the popular 
will with a distinctly liberal and noticeably Africanist sociology (if 1 may be permitted such an 
expression): today it speaks of “black” people winning control of an economy owned and
' The tlicory of National Democratic Revolution required a two-staged stniggle for socialistn : the first would be 
a national stmggle in w liicli die working class allied itself w ith other natiotially oppressed classes to establish a 
« national-democratic state » - neither capitalist, nor socialist but rather socialist in orientation, according to the 
famous formulation of Jeremy Cronin and Raymond Suitner ((1986). 30 Years o f  the Freedom Charier. 
Johannesburg: Ravan Press) -  followed by a proletarian revohitionar> struggle.
0controlled by “whites” so that all South Africans may equally become consumers and owners of 
property!
We can define the rupture that has occurred in South African alliance politics since the mid- 
I990’s as follows: the politics o f national-democratic revolution spoke o f the “people” as 
“national-democratic” subjects, represented directly through “organs of people’s power”, in 
search of a class-less, non-racial society. The politics attached to GEAR today speaks, rather, of 
a “black” people seeking a political and economic universe of free and equal individuals It is 
important, nonetheless, to notice the (apparent) convergence of terms between a project informed 
by NDR and a liberal-nationalist politics. NDR easily spoke of “blacks” as a synonym for the 
“nationally oppressed” -  where the term here automatically embraced “Coloureds” and “Indians” 
while the proponents of GEAR are able to claim that “black” ownership and control of the 
economy is consistent with the promise that the wealth o f the land be shared by all!" This 
slippage of terms is made possible precisely because both the NDR and GEAR are firmly 
enclosed on the same side of the dichotomy o f which Rosanvallon speaks. In other words, 
neither the politics o f NDR nor of GEAR seek better to represent the “people” in their lived 
categories o f existence The struggle against apartheid did not simply demand that the voice of 
“blacks” be equally represented amongst those of “whites”, “Coloureds” and “Indians”. Indeed 
this was the (eventual) promise o f the Tri-cameral parliament introduced by the apartheid 
government in its reformist stage. “National-democratic” subjects and “blacks” do not refer to 
sociological categories. They do not express the interest of a particular fraction o f the South 
African “people” conceived as a multi-racial collective Rather, they designate historical figures 
bearing a national task of dissolution and revolutionary incarnation They describe respectively 
the universal agents charged with realising a new and unified South African “people”: composed 
of non-racial subjects in the case of NDR and (“free and equal”) individuals in the case of 
GEAR The slippage o f terms between them is made possible, therefore, exactly because the 
“national-democratic” subject and the “black” person are only substantial, physical beings during 
a certain political moment “Blacks” are not a group defined by race or pigment or class or 
gender or geography or profession or employment and so. They are merely those subjects 
conjured in and through “black” liberation When NDR and GEAR thus refer to the South 
African “people” they refer to a potential, not a concrete social mass. In this regard the identity of 
the “people” is given by the political projects that seek to incarnate it. We can say, therefore, that 
the South African democratic project is less interested in the lived, concrete sociology of the 
“people” than it is in consecrating a new political subject It seeks less to represent South 
Africans in their lived differences -  a project too reminiscent of apartheid -  than to realise a new 
“people”, liberated from their apartheid-given identities
What is important to notice is that neither NDR, nor GEAR accommodates a “customary” 
subject as a legitimate political actor. Customary practices are judged survivals o f an apartheid- 
colonial past that should be overcome in a new unified South African “people”. We should note, 
therefore, that within the limits of such a project the impossibility o f thinking “customary” 
subjects arises not from the fact that customary practices are in themselves contrary to every
' The GEAR policy is expressed as a vigorous stress on « afTirnialive action » - promoting the employment of 
« black » persons in go\ cmmcnt and business, raising « black » capital -  often trade-union funds -  for 
investment in the market and for acquiring « white » companies, the desire to encourage the emergence of a 
« black » middle class, and so on
" Wliich hits not stopped the charge from many quarters in South Africa tliat it is not self-evident how the 
enrichment of a « black » middle-class or how « black » corporate ownership and conUol improves the material 
circumstances of South Africa’s poor, unemployed (placed at between 25 and 40%) and homeless
democratic practice', but rather that they are incompatible with the image of the national figure to 
be produced. The difficulty of accommodating customary subjects in the South African 
“people”, therefore, does not arise from the distance between them and democratic principles, 
but rather from the objectives of the national project itself
This is what 1 have suggested elsewhere* was at the heart of the Katorus violence. Zulu-speaking 
hostel dwellers and others were disinclined to the anti-apartheid politics that animated the 1980’s 
and early 1990’s precisely because they did not easily recognise themselves as either African 
National Subjects or National Democratic Subjects. Their disengagement from political 
campaigns during this period was judged by organisations sympathetic to the ANC as evidence 
of their disinterest in the anti-apartheid struggle, if not, and even worse, as proof of their 
collaboration with the apartheid state" In other words, the moment they were seen not to attach 
to the national democratic project they ceased to belong to the (agent o f the) South African 
“people” There was no space in this practice for social difference expressed as political 
difference Certainly, the “people” as a sociological entity, according to NDR, was complex and 
structured in difference, but as a political unity they were commonly gathered behind a single 
flag: national liberation. Customary subjects in Katorus were not deemed adversaries because 
their actual behaviour realty threatened the democratic project, but more importantly, because it 
simply could not understand them when did not act like national-democratic subjects We can 
say, in other words, that customary subjects were deemed lacking this national-democratic 
quality, this political Active ethnicity, that would have rendered them comprehensible to the 
protagonists o f a national-democratic struggle In this version of the South African project, 
therefore, the figure of the national subject to he was given by the figure of the individual in 
pursuit of National-Liberation In its GEAR rendition it is supplied by the figure o f the (black) 
economically independent individual. In both cases, however, the native is unthinkable within 
the limits of the national project precisely because it is deemed to lack either o f these (Active) 
ethnic properties. But we shall see in a moment that the national project also appeals to another 
political logic; one that seeks, not to incarnate something new, but to accommodate the existing 
social heterogeneity in a single political authority. Here the national subject is not invested with 
any particular identity (political, cultural, linguistic, racial or economic) apart from a legal status 
But we shall see that this makes it no more easy to think the native in the limits of the national 
project. For what they lack here is not a Active ethnicity but, more importantly, a national 
Ethnicity; this quality that would make of them national individuals in the first place.
t.2. The limit o f a representative project
If customary subjectivities are unthinkable as legitimate political identities in South Africa 
because of the nature of the democratic project, we will And it no easier to think them in a 
practice seeking to represent the “people” in their concrete differences. This is true not simply 
because the essential (and hence representable) contours o f the “people” are not given by science 
-  but are constructed and contested through political and intellectual struggle -  but because the 
problem is not simply one of typology If we return quickly to the formulation of Rosanvallon 
cited earlier we see the slippage between the republican project in the context that concerns us
‘ This is Uie approacli of Malunood Mamdani who advocates intcgraliiig customary institiilions into tlic post­
colonial stale by slrcngthcning their iidiercnt democratic potential.
” The alienation of customary subjects from tradc-miion activities marks one of the great tragedies of the 
democratic transition. During the early 1980’s migrant workers in Johannesburg and Durbmi were at the 
forefront of a militant trade-mrionism. w'ho became gradually disenchanted w'iUi a miion politics that 
progressively articulated itself to struggles not solely concerned with wages and working conditions. Many 
hostel dwellers had mitil then been content to express their interests as workers Urrough the trade-unions and 
their political aspirations through the customary system.
" )
The democratic imperative, he suggests, requires “la definition d’un regime d’autorite et d’un 
sujet I’exercant” where the political subject(s) in question is deemed uniform and essentially 
identical But we shall see that in South Africa the citizen, ‘te sujet exercant’, is, at best, simply a 
legal-constitutional figure, for in practice there are several competing political subjects active in 
the social whole. If a project o f incarnation equates the national spirit or character with a certain 
unique figure, and grants to a specific political agent the historical task o f realising the “people” 
anew or at all, a representative project, while apparently admitting social difference, nonetheless 
assumes that ‘we’ are always, already identical individuals.
This hypothesis will become clearer through a reading of a paradigmatic example 1 have 
selected to consider here briefly the content o f what Alain Touraine calls a democratic 
multicultural politics precisely because it seemingly concerns the reconciliation of multiple 
subjectivities in a democratic space. Or rather, it apparently concerns a national politics not 
premised on a fictive ethnicity. I will restrict my comments to what he defines as the limit of 
Western democracy’ In its usage here the latter term refers to those practices (theoretical and 
political) premised on an opposition between a public sphere governed by reason and laws 
conforming to rational organisation and a private domain dominated by tradition and by 
passions In this political universe, Touraine suggests, the social order is considered the province 
of rationality where its laws approach or should approach those of nature, whereas the individual 
and the communities to which it belongs (the family, the village, the parish, the region and the 
nation as an ethnic totality) reproduce demands antithetical to rational exchanges Such a 
conception subordinates the civil, economic and cultural society to the political so that social 
commerce is organised by rational laws obeying reason
We should note several elements o f this political practice according to Touraine. It is necessarily 
harnessed to what he and others have called a politics o f ‘ends’, what I have earlier termed a 
politics o f incarnation: it seeks to construct the single and unique authority o f the (universal) law 
above the plurality o f cultures'’ by constituting a new subject embodying the general It is in this 
spirit that the French state hoped work, education and obedience to the law would make of 
immigrants and others rooted in their social particularisms national citizens that behaved 
according to universalist principles That is, such a practice treats as inferior those social 
behaviours or identities deemed obstacles to the march o f reason because chained to their 
singularity It is precisely against the “hegemony” o f categories deemed to express the general 
spirit or personality (the ethnicity?) o f the national subject that a multiculturalism protests". It 
seeks to admit as legitimate and equal those social identities not deemed by a republican 
democratic project compatible with its universal mission Its target, therefore, is a certain 
conception of democracy itself it claims to be a democratic practice cognisant o f sociological 
realities against a project premised on formal philosophical abstractions. In this regard, Touraine 
and others have spoken of a politics of ‘means’ as opposed to one o f ‘ends’ which distinguish 
themselves by how they conceive the political subject and, therefore, how they understand the 
democratic ambition
‘The Subject is no longer, thercrore. the presence of Ihe universal, or reason or of God in (lie individual, as i( was 
in classical philosophy It is nearly the opposite, the will to combine that which is transmitted and tliat which is 
acquired, instrumental rationality and cultural memory. From the utopian image of the ideal society, is substituted 
the pragmatic image of (he individual | | who tries to be free and manage its life as a personal experience'^”
(imc).'
' 'Lc Sujet n est done plus la presence dc I’universel. dc la raison ou dc Dieu dans I’individu, comme il l’6tait 
dans la philosophic classique II est, prcsqiie au contraire, la volontc dc combiner ce qui est transmis et ce qui est 
acquis, la rationalite instnimcntale el la munoire ciillurelle A I’imagc utopique dc la sociele idcale, ralionnelle.
If a republican project thus associates reason with a certain social destination -  a “people” 
sharing a common identity -  and seeks, therefore, to incarnate a new subject released from its 
historical idiosyncracies, a multicultural practice, according to Touraine, finds the law of reason 
expressed in the legal and political practices that permit the pursuit o f a universal individual 
ambition A politics of ‘means’, that is, charges the democratic authority with the task of 
enabling each individual best to realise their own self-defined ‘ends’. Universal values are thus 
reconciled with the exercise of particularist ambitions when the institutional and legal ‘means’ 
that permit the realisation of personal and heterogenous ‘ends’ express the law of reason But we 
shall see that such a project empties the social whole of difference at the very moment when it 
claims to affirm it Or rather, it performs a strict separation between cultural and political 
subjectivities that grants complexity to the former while conceiving o f the latter as identical and 
universal Subjects may seek diverse personal and familial destinations provided they all, without 
exception, conduct themselves in exactly the same way as political subjects. Touraine is thus 
satisfied to view individual identities as products o f their contingent historical and sociological 
conditions, and political identities as general and a priori
To his question: “comment combiner ce qui est separe, comment faire vivre ensemble des 
individus et des groupes qui ont des cultures differentes,” '  ^Touraine replies.
'I see only one response to tlris question. The coinbinalion of public activity and the meaning of the private 
experience caimot only be realised in the experience of the life of the individual'^ [...] After civic rights, purely 
uni\crsal, and already diverse social rights, appear cultural riglils tliat are both rights to difference and the 
recognition of tire universal interest of every culture | l"’” (imc)'.
A multiculural project thus asserts the “droit de chaque individu a agir comme Sujet et, par 
consequent, du droit au pluralisme dont la contrepartie est le devoir de chacun de reconnaltre 
le droit de I’autre a etre accepte comme Sujet” '* precisely because it is the effort to give 
universal sense to a particular experience that defines the essential human ambition. In a world 
context where the state is no longer able to mediate between the individual and a global economy 
to fix or give meaning to social referents, Touraine displaces this task away from political 
institutions to the private and familial domain o f the individual It is exactly the so-called 
universality o f this existential drive that makes of otherwise incommensurate cultural 
subjectivities equivalent and equal political subjects But 1 want to show how his arguments rests 
on a tautology that invests concrete individuals with a so-called natural quality that is nothing 
more than the personality o f the political subject We have already noted that the question 
inspiring his analysis/manifesto is the following: how to combine that which is separate, how to 
make individuals and groups that are culturally different live together. To achieve such a  ^
reconciliation Touraine wants to establish the commonality o f otherwise heterogeneous 
elements This he does by invoking the existential individual -  the subject seeking meaning -at 
the kernel of every culture and society.
“All huiixui beings arc bom and live free and equal in riglils. Tliis judgcnicnl must apply lo all societies. Tlte aim of 
the luiuvcrsal and rc;d| socitd actor, Touraine e.vpiains, is to constnict himself as an actor, as an somctliing tliat
sc subsliluc Timagc pragmatique de Tindividu l .. , | qui tenlc de constilucr sa liberie el de gercr sa vie comme 
unc experience pcrsonncllc ”
' “Jc n’aperyois qu'mic reponse a celle question cenirale La combinaison de I’aclivile piibliquc cl du sens de 
Tcxpcrience privee ne petti se realiser que dans rexpericnce de vie de I’individu |...|Apres Ics droits civiques, 
purcnicnl universalistcs, cl les droits sociaux deja diversincs, apparaissent les droits culturels qui soni a la fois 
droits a la difference et reconnaissance de I’inierel univcrsci de chaque culture 1... |”
0manages themself (autogerer|, to be free. indepcndaiU and responsable as much as particular. [ . | it is this desire to 
be Subject, tliat makes possible and necessary the combination of instrumentality and identity” .” (imc).'
But the extent to which the desire to be a Subject is a given feature of our humanity depends on 
the conditions under which such a humanity is constituted! What is so easily dismissed as 
apparently irrelevant in the above formulation is the entire psychoanalytic tradition since Freud. 
Or even the structural anthropology since Levi-Strauss A brief example will suffice. Andreas 
Bertoldi and Susan Van Zyl recount Octave Mannoni’s study o f the pathologies produced by 
colonialism in Madagascar. It is worth including an extract of their text.
' E.xpressed in Freudian (enns, (...) Westerners, mtlike the Malagasy are called upon to resolve Oedipus but seldom 
do Tlie Malagasy, is not e.xpectcd to survive an orplianed state. He is never enjoined to grow up in the same way in 
which someone in tlie West is expected to Whereas most Europeans solve their dependency by repressing or 
sublimating it. most Malagasy avoid the consequences of inferiority by accepting dependence. So long as | .. | the 
satisfying dependent relation is preserved the Malagiisy are not subject to tlie inferiority complex. When there is a 
stable relation to superiors, the question of inferiority does not rise. Dependence thus emerges as a complex when 
something vital to the Malagasy’s well being is missing. Wlien bonds of dependence are threatened the Malagasy 
wishes to preserve them, even if it means relying upon the powerful and potentially tlireatening while man or 
seeking security in the white man's institutions. In die course of colonisation the Malagasy transfers to tlie coloniser 
the affects of dependence wliich. in liis own society, he is never called to liquidate Tlie first dependent relation to 
the father is replaced by dependent relations to others -  superiors or ancestors. Symptoms in the colonised 
malagasy are often expressed in the wavering between dependence upon his ancestors on the one hand and the 
white man and his institutions on the other”"'
In this account of the Malagasy, therefore, the aim of the social actor is not to be free, to manage 
him or herself as Subject, to be independent As colonial subjects the Malagasy ‘chose’ 
subjection. Does the schizophrenic behave like a human being? Certainly we can say that the 
rays of sunshine in president Schreber’s arse”  are products o f his “personal life experience” (I), 
but the meaning he makes of such rays defy, absolutely, their capture to the terms discussed by 
Touraine above. Even in his locution we can wonder if the human being is only a phenomenon 
of a particular conjuncture It arises when, as Touraine himself admits, meaning is deemed 
absent, when social unity is apparently threatened by a lack o f norms giving sense to the relations 
between the individual and the society. For such meaning is nothing more than the recognition 
by each subject that despite their differences they belong to the same social unity^°; that, in other 
words, they are already national subjects Touraine merely reads the ambition o f the multicultural 
project back into the universal nature of the human being But we should note that he is not 
driven to such circularity by any a J  hominem inconsistency Rather, it is a tautology inscribed in 
the logic o f every national political project. In order to posit the commensurability o f its subjects 
it is driven to distill from them a common and essential quality: a spirit or an interest or a right It 
is this logic that requires from the national intention the supposition of a unique political subject, 
or what Rosanvallon has called “im sujet exer?ant”. It is this logic, moreover, that exhausts the 
South African debate about customary subjects and the constitutional clauses concerning them 
We can quickly summarise these attitudes and provisions by way o f a metaphor made popular by 
the Bishop of the Anglican Church, Desmond Tutu, after the first democratic election in 1994 
Following the remarkable passage of April 27, Tutu enthusiastically declared “we are the 
rainbow nation”. The image depicts a heterogeneous social totality -  represented as the
“Tous les etres huiiiains naisseni et viveni fibres el egaux en drolls cl ce jugemeni doll s’appliquer ^ loulcs les 
socieles'”1 . I le bul de I’acleur (social reel el univcrsclj, Touraine explains, esi de se consiruire lui-meme 
coniine acleur. d ’aulogerer, d'eire fibre, independani, responsable en lani qu’eire parliculier. Cetle volonid 
d’individualion dcfinil la subjeclivalion el e’esi celle-ci. Ic dcsir d’etre Sujet, qui rend possible et necessaire la 
conibinaison de rinstruinenlalilc et de I'idenlite”
differently coloured strands of the rainbow -  unified by their common belonging to the South 
African nation It is not difficult to see how such an image is captured by the terms of the 
“democratic multiculturalism” discussed above.
What is lacking in Touraine’s analysis is a distinction between the nature of the human being in 
general, and the nature o f the human being as a national subject His individuals are not simply 
human, they are members o f a specific political community. Their rights are conferred according 
to criteria, to certain standards that are the standards of the state. The schizophrenic is 
incomprehensible to Touraine’s model not because he or she is not a (biological) human being, 
but because his or her humanity produces other effects. His symptoms, that is, are 
incomprehensible to a (would be multicultural) state practice. The Malagasy escape Touraine’s 
terms because as a political subject they are disinclined to act as individuals. But to a colonial 
state, for sure, they are oh so delightfully normal. Human nature is a state nature. It is the quality 
that renders individuals intelligible to political apparatuses; or more precisely it is the quality that 
makes biological individuals, individuals of a State. Touraine misrecognises the ‘hegemony of 
categories’ as symptoms merely of a particular republican project -  one that associates reason 
with certain behaviours rather than the means that allow the expression o f multiple demeanors 
What he fails to appreciate is that such a hierarchy is a necessary condition of every state 
practice. For it is nothing less than the standard according to which the state defines its limit It is 
the measure o f normalcy that permits the distinction between legitimate national subjects (those 
granted rights) and the foreigner (those not, or those given only partial rights). The nature of the 
political subject, therefore, is not given by their psychology or even their biology, it is not the 
historical conditions under which they have been called (or not) to resolve Oedipus, but it is this 
quality that renders them reasonable in the political community
- N
Once we admit this distinction we will find that the political subject is invested with a nature 
depending on the form of the state in its concrete conditions Or rather, the ‘strangeness’ of the 
foreigner is given by her distance from the image of the national subject. The substance of 
difference and likeness, o f human nature, has a history. It is the history o f the political subject 
Touraine is justified, therefore, to suggest that the impossibility of thinking the cultural subject in 
the limits o f the republican model arises from its distance from the figure of so-called reason. 
Measured against this standard o f nature they are found to be alien. But he is wrong to believe to 
have escaped this logic by appealing to a universal human temperament. A national project 
admits only those who evidence a nature defined in and by the state -  the condition, surely, for 
political struggle - and not a nature given by their psychic history or even biology. The normalcy 
of a citizen, therefore, is not, as he wants us to believe, their conduct vis-a-vis human rights but, 
rather, that quality that permits their recognition by the state (an ethnic criterion) and their 
practice (their sociability) as rights-bearing subjects If we displace the discussion away from 
political and legal provisions, we will see, that this quality is a certain bearing in time and space 
And it is exactly this orientation that is lacking in customary subjects; and for this reason that 
they are incomprehensible to the democratic project
The contradiction between customary as opposed to civic subjects arises, therefore, from the 
presence in the same territory of multiple state apparatuses that hail non-equivalent political 
subjects What gives to colonial societies their specificity, that is, is not simply their cultural 
diversity, or even the multiplicity of subjects attached to diverse political aesthetics, but rather 
the presence of incommensurate political subjects hailed in and through diverse slate practices 
The challenge that arises in the context under consideration is not simply one of cultural 
reconciliation or communication to produce a unified “people”, but rather one of political 
integration; either to produce a single and commensurate political subject -  that is, the hegemony
of a certain political authority (a national project)- or the means to accommodate multiple 
political subjects in the same authority -  a radically different type of project.
2. Messianic and Homogenous Time
My remarks so far serve to raise the following question: what is the quality that is assumed 
always already present in national subjects? Or rather who is an individual in the nation?
Benedict Anderson proposes that we think of the nation or o f nationalism or o f nation-ness, not 
as ideologies akin to fascism or liberalism, but as cultural artifacts that have come into 
Ac/H^^Their modernity -  as objectively recent to the historian’s eye -  follows from their mode 
of emanation as imagined communities that are simultaneously limited and sovereign; that is,
0 encompassing finite, if not elastic, boundaries beyond which lie other nations and in which the gage and emblem of their freedom is the sovereign state^^. Here he distinguishes between two 
forms of national imagining: what he terms official and populist, that despite their service to 
different ends (the preservation of dynastic power and anti-metropolitan resistance in the 
Western hemisphere respectively) share a common philology and lexicon. The nation as an 
imagined community was a radical epistemological event What made it possible to “think” was 
a “fiindamental change” in modes of apprehending the world at the end o f the eighteenth 
century^’. What is important is to notice the promise of Anderson’s argument. The determinate 
structure of a cultural artifact is deduced from the styk^* in which it was originally thought In 
this respect we are invited to conceive o f the nation in the same way as we might think of the 
‘French Revolution’ for example.
"The overwhelming and bewildering concatenation of events expenenced by its makers and its victims became a 
tiling’ -  iutd with its own name: The Fiench Revolution. Like a vast shapeless rock worn to a rounded boulder by 
countless drops of water, the experience was slutped by millions of printed words into a ‘concept’ on the printed 
page, and. in due course, into a model Wliy it’ broke out, wliat ‘it’ aimed for, why ‘it” succeeded or failed, 
became subjects for endless polemics on the part of friends and foes (..
Anderson’s analysis thus proceeds according to two steps He considers (I) the premises and 
conventions^*’, that is the mode of apprehension, informing (2) those that imagined political 
communities; where their form is given by the style in which they were thought, and where their 
merely contingent features are the products o f the who, where and when they were conceived 
Like the French Revolution a certain quantity of events are unified according to a certain mode 
of conjunction (the style), which is in turn named and inscribed in history as an object This is the
0 novelty of Anderson’s approach: his is not a history of nations in and through time, but rather a history of a certain “idea” of time; a history o f the concrete imaginings permitted by such an 
idea “Communities are to be distinguished”, he suggests, “by the style in which they are 
imagined” ’^ . In contrast to dynastic and religious communities that conceived unities not in 
terms of causality or dependence but in terms, rather, o f prefiguring and frilfillment -  in what 
Walter Benjamin described as ‘messianic time’ -  the nation was imagined in homogenous time 
The ontological ground o f the nation-artifact was prepared we are told when certain cultural 
conceptions lost their axiomatic grip'. “The first of these was the idea that a particular script- 
language offered privileged access to ontological truth”. Second was “the belief that society was 
naturally organised around and under high centres -  monarchs who were persons apart from 
other human beings and who ruled by some form of cosmological (divine) dispensation. Human 
loyalties were necessarily hierarchical and centripetal because the ruler, like the sacred script.
' His arguinciil is rcniiiiiscciil of the Alibusserian reading of Marx; where the epistemological rupture between 
titc young and matnre works is characterised by a break with Hegels concept of time. In this regard the Marxist 
social whole is distinguished from the Hegelian social lolalily by the temporal order in which they arc conceived
was a node of access to being and inherent in it”. Third was a “conception of temporality in 
which cosmology and history were indistinguishable, the origins of the world and of men 
essentially identical^*” Human time was the time of God since the social totality, being merely 
an epi-phenomenon of the divine that was its unique author, developed according to His plan. 
Dynastic and religious communities had no history, other than the scheme of God; their 
causalities and events were never determined by processes internal to themselves but rather 
announced as such through divine revelation to chosen figures'. We should notice the radical 
distance of these communities from modern ones: the nature o f things is not given by properties 
they might acquire in social relations (indeed, the stage of the social is not produced) but 
uniquely by their place in the scheme of God -  revealed through certain privileged texts or 
revealing itself through certain miraculous appearances. Without a social referent distinctions 
and similarities are only available from marks bearing divine properties, or rather, only when 
material characteristic testify to divine intentions do they achieve the status o f a distinguishing 
criterion. The limits o f representing properties-in-common between individuals, of imagining the 
community, is fixed by the divine, symbolic referents that are either announced or revealed. 
Hence the empirical boundaries o f the Christian, Islamic and Buddhist communities were given 
by the limits o f their sacred languages (Latin, Arabic, Chinese) -  solely capable of expressing 
Divine intentions”, so that their literate priesthoods were the privileged savants o f Godly 
purpose. Dynastic communities, on the other hand, produced and reproduced their unities 
through marriage and inter-marriage -  the community, given corporality in the body of the 
sovereign, expanded or was integrated according to his progenital liaisons In both cases, 
however, we should note that the community is not that body bearing common scxial traits, that 
is, represented as producing it’s unity in and o f itself How could it when ‘social’ relations are 
mere phenomena without consistency of their own Hence the form of dynastic and religious 
communities: they encompassed diverse linguistic and cultural groups -  precisely because these 
were not the measures of commonality, precisely because their criteria o f membership were 
variously heretic/ believer, obedience/ disobedience, chosen/ damned and so on. They were not 
territorially fixed because these properties were not indices of a horizontal connection between 
people, but a vertical relation between individuals, their intermediaries and the divine (a 
Christian, for example, could be Christian anywhere) Even the boundary of a dynastic state was 
porous and indistinct (as opposed to the modern which is “fully, flatly and evenly operative over 
each square centimetre o f a large demarcated territory^’”), it enclosed not citizens from which it 
derived its legitimacy but subjects over whom it exercised power The community did not 
receive it’s coherence or its consistency from the subjects that belonged to it but merely from the
' David Landes suggests dial such a conceplion would help us understand Ihe function of hydraulic time pieces 
as used by the Chinese, for example. He finds invalid to derive die laler European mechanisms from the latter 
precisely because they were gencrically different. Tlie European meclianical clock was designed accurately to 
calibrate time into hours and minutes and eventually seconds. Tliis was not Ihe case with die Chines hydraulic 
system. It was less interested in the precise repartition of units of time tlian it was in predicting movement. In 
short, the Chinese hydraulic clock was an astrological instrument Imperial power derived from its monopoly of 
astrological knowledge that pennitted it to synchronise and calibrate social and political events according to the 
movement of cosmic forces. Forecasts of the position of the stars (verifiable by sight in the night skies) enabled 
die emperor and his funedonaries to plan and legitimate events according to the omens and cosmology 
associated with each parUcular stellar constellation. The time of the imperial community flowed according to the 
rhythms of celestial bodies tliat announced Ihe lime for war and the lime for peace, the lime for faithfulness and 
for infidelity. Ihe lime for tributes and Ihe lime for successions. (Landes. David (1987) L 'heure qu 'il esi: Les 
horloges, la mesure du temps et la fornialton du monde moderne (traduil de Fanglais par Pierre-Emmanuel 
Dau/at et Emmanuel Evrard) Editions Gallimard: Paris
" As Anderson remarks, the priviliged status of these languages followed from a belief in Ihe non-arbilrary nature 
of the sign, that enabled them solely to express the intention of Ihe divine Hence die non-lranslabilily, until
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monarchical figure that embodied it; such that its reproduction coincided exactly with his 
fortune: expanding or contracting through war (displacement o f or by another king) or through 
marriage (the joining of communities)
What replaced this mock o f apprehension, we are told, was an ‘idea’ o f homogenous time that 
was the time of the scMjial. We need not be concerned, for the moment, with what generated this 
change -  1 will sketch a possibility later -  though we can say now that it was not an effect o f the 
expansion of the forces of production Anderson approaches a description of this idea through 
the example o f the modern novel. Characters that never meet and whose existence is unknown to 
each other are nonetheless connected in the story through a double movement:
• they are both “embedded” in particular ‘societies’ (Wessex, Liibeck, Los Angeles are the 
examples Anderson selects, but we could equally say Johannesburg, Kinshasa and Kisumu); 
such that they could pass each other in the street without knowing one another and still be 
connected, and
• they are “embedded” in the reader’s mind, so that despite their simultaneous and parallel 
actions (A quarrels with B while C and D make love; A telephones C while B shops while D 
plays pool; D gets drunk while A dines at home with B w hik C has an ominous dream) they 
nonetheless constitute a community of characters in the book.
We can add, to give to Anderson’s analysis the full force of homogenous time as intended by 
Walter Benjamin, that:
• the parallel and simultaneous lives of each character are embedded in a single movement that 
is evolving towards a climax. Past, present and future are merely stages in an evolving and 
progressive history
This, Anderson tells us, is analogous to the idea of the nation: o f a community of individuals 
mostly anonymous to each other (we do not have personal relations with our fellow 38 million 
South Africans, 240 million Americans and so on) who steadily and simultaneously go about 
their affairs in a common space, content in the belief that they share with each other something 
or other in common and who, together, evolve progressively towards a telos. The nation is that 
community in time who passes from the past through the present to the future in a steady, even 
stride; stubbornly believing in its own progress^°.
Already we have here a potential sketch of the contradiction between customary and national 
subjects: they represent different ‘styles’ o f community that invoke criteria of belonging 
according to incompatible ‘modes of apprehension’ In other words, the national subject is an 
individual that lives according to homogenous time whereas the customary subject does not. This 
approach is certainly helpful; but we should not believe that in itself it concludes our discussion 
Certainly the customary imagination cannot simply be read from religious or dynastic 
representations; although they illuminate certain of its contours. But more importantly, merely 
describing certain o f their epistemological features obscures contradictions and antagonism 
produced in the real, it is exactly this process that concerns me here: what are the effects of this 
contradiction In other words, what is the nature of the contradiction produced between 
individuals in homogenous time and subjects in messianic time? And where does it manifest? 
May we leave indeterminate the conditions of this ‘idea’ o f time that permit the nation, and
recently, ot the Qu’aran from Arabic and tlie debates in Uie Catholic Church over tfie appropriate language (Latin 
or vernacular) in wliich to pray and conduct services.
concentrate merely on its agents (the method of Benedict Anderson) In other words, are the 
effects simply produced in the political about the political. This is trend in South Africa: as we 
have seen, reducing the ‘problem’ of ‘traditional’ authorities to one of their institutional role a 
pro/xts local governments, for example It is manifest too in South African political and 
academic responses to violence in the province of KwaZulu-Natal and in the Reef townships 
When conflict is not reduced either to an inflamed ethnic struggle, to the work of the apartheid 
state or to an expression of contradictions produced by the apartheid political-economy, it is 
treated as a conflict between different images o f political community (national and central vs. 
national and federal or democratic (and central) v.y customary (and federal)). What all these 
studies share is a common neglect of why these conflicts received expression in the terms they 
did Why are some people amenable to a certain ‘mode of apprehension’ and others not? Why, 
that is, do so-called ‘interests’ receive expression in the way they do? Are the effects of the 
contradiction produced at the level of its conditions? Is the contradiction between customary and 
national subjects present, not in the way they express this contradiction to themselves, but at the 
level of its pre-conditions'}
The stakes are not negligeable. An example will suffice. Is the problem of customary subjects a 
problem for national unity such that it is accomplished (or not) to the extent that the agents of the 
customary imagination (Kings, Chiefs, and their parliamentary defenders) represent themselves 
and their subjects as national citizens? This seems to me to be the current strategy of the South 
African government -  where the contradiction is deemed to be resolved when these agents are 
integrated into the national state and its apparatuses. Or is ‘national unity’ itself merely an 
ideological effect that ‘dissimulates’ the real contradiction: that customary practices are 
incomprehensible to state apparatuses (even when their representatives formally submit to them) 
so that the effects of the contradiction are, in the first place, felt at the level o f governance and in 
the second at the level of the forces of production? This is the approach that will be taken here, 
for, in the case o f the other, when it moves from description to explanation it slides into 
tautology'.
We can approach our problem via what Claude Lefort describes as an ambiguity in Marx’s 
vision of history It is most apparent when we ask the following: what produced the 
transformation of the pre-capitalist mode of production to one that was properly speaking 
capitalist? The question is relevant for our purposes We could restate it as what is the rupture 
that summons homogenous time? Let us note the passages in Marx that according to Lefort 
proceed according to a specious continuity. Analysing the way handicrafts are transformed by 
manufacturing, Marx writes:
“Oil die one liand it arises from the coiiibiiuilion of various independent trades, wliich lose dial independence and 
become specialized to such an extent dial diey arc reduced to merely supplementary and partial operations in die 
produedon of one particular commodity. On the other hand, it arises from the co-operation of craftsmen in one 
particular liandicrafi; it splits up tlial luuidicrad into its various detailed operations, isoladng these operaUons and 
developing their muttuil independence to the point where each becomes the exclusive frmetion of a particular 
worker”’'
Later he suggests:
' In a disserttilion for the Political Studies department of the University of the Witwatersrand I proposed that 
South African historiography was informed by a theoretical prejudice dial rendered its methodology circular 
Despite its pretentiousness I believe that its central argument was correct. See Thinking m « new vrav.r » some 
thoughts on South African historiography, a dissertation for the degree of Bachelor of Arts with Honours 
Johannesburg : February. 1993.
Tlie history of manufacture proper shows how Uie division of labour which is peculiar to it acquires the most 
appropriate fomi at first by experience, as it were bctiind tlie backs of the actors, and then, like the guild 
liandicrafls, slri\ es to hold fast that fonn when once it lias been found, and liere and there succeeds in keeping it for
centuries”^^ .
At first simple co-operation is followed by manufacturing based on the division of labour. 
“[T]his phenomenon”, remarks Lefort, “designates much more than a separation of the labourer 
and his means of production; it is the separation of the labourer from himself, or his dissolution 
within the collective /a^>o«re/'”(emphasis in the original)’’. At stake is the genesis o f capitalism. 
Let us recall that what characterises pre-capitalist (Asiatic. Ancient and Feudal) social relations is 
not merely that labour is united with its material presuppositions but that labour as such has not 
yet acquired its meaning. Independent private-owners or co-owners (either individual or familial) 
are only the “personifications o f communal property”; they are only ‘labourers’ to the extent that 
they participate in the community, in the communal property. It is not they who own their 
labour-power or their means o f production but the clan (whatever its form). To find, therefore, 
that the ‘labourer’ is separated from his means of production is to find, not simply, that he is 
separated from his own body, that production no longer accomodates itself to the expertise of 
craftsmen, that he is organised in a “total process” that assigns to each worker a partial process, 
that he is “divided up, and transformed into the automatic motor of a detail operation ”, that he 
is only a “mere fragment o f his body”. The burden of proof is much greater. It is to find that “the 
process of socialization of labour breaks with the communal reality and representation which 
survived in the collective labourer” (my emphasis)” ; that, in other words, “[t]he rootedness in a 
particular mode of existence and the private appropriation of techniques gives way to the 
growing mobility o f labourers and the growing transparency o f  their activities and their 
relations" (my emphasis)". What is at stake is the appearance o f social, o f the freedom of 
individuals from the hold of the past and o f the demystification o f the relationship to reality. 
Now what Marx presents to us as a single movement punctuated merely by stages 
(manufacturing/o//oH'.v from handicrafts) Lefort wants us to admit is utterly strange; is a most 
surprising rupture. From conditions under which ‘labourers’ live and imagine themselves as 
instances of clan communities to those under which such representations dissolve and social 
relations appear as they really are. It is not necessary to accompany Lefort further, other than to 
note Marx’s contradictions: he is forced to concede the durability o f communal representations 
in the face o f the development o f the forces of production (when he deals with the Asiatic mode 
of production) and he himself suggests that the labourer represents social relations not 
transparent to themselves but mediated by phantoms, superstition, prejudice and the past (in Ihe 
Eighteenth Brumaire) We can certainly agree with Lefort that Marx failed to draw the 
consequences o f his analyses in the Gnindrtsse, o f the resistance o f past imaginations, and hence 
did not consider the real conditions of their dissolution But he was nonetheless correct to relate 
the dissolution o f communal representations to the expansion of the forces of production; not as 
the occasion of this process itself but as latent under certain conditions; as latent when capitalism 
is obliged to exploit national citizens.
We need not repeat a tired debate in South Africa to notice the durability o f ‘labourers’ (that is, 
clan or communal subjects) in capitalist manufacture The argument between so-called ‘liberal’ 
and ‘radical’ scholars hinged precisely on the importance accorded to migrant labour for the 
expansion of the forces of production; whether, that is, they were necessary (requiring state 
interventions to reproduce the migrant labour system and to manage its effects, that is Apartheid) 
or were merely contingent (absolving capitalism itself for Apartheid). What was analysed in 
South Africa was the (unstable) articulation of messianic time to capitalist production. If the 
division of labour itself lacked the status of a ‘normal’ hierarchy -  although it was granted a 
semblance of customary order by assimilating to it ‘traditional’ bearers o f authority - it was
nonetheless lived as an unpleasant but necessary evil: wage-labour was the basis o f maintaining 
natural bonds elsewhere Compliance to the division of tasks, that is, was not sanctioned by the 
order of things as they were in the division of labour (worker/foreman/manager/boss) but by the 
order o f things as they were in the commune. Indeed, what South African historians have 
stressed is the role played by the apartheid state and ‘traditional’ authorities in the 
‘proleterianisation’ o f customary workers; that, in other words, the reproduction o f the 
communal labourer in the heart o f capitalist production was mediaied by certain state forms. 
That is, the bond between the customary-worker (the migrant labourer) and his community was 
sustained through state practices that held and reproduced individuals in a certain temporal order 
-  what, for the moment, we can describe as messianic. We need not be concerned here with the 
mechanics of this relation or even the nature of operations (premised on cheap-labour and a low 
skills base) that lend themselves to such an articulation, merely to notice that when either 
customary authorities or the colonial state are no longer able to play this role or when capitalist 
production requires a different kind of worker (specialised or skilled) another form of state 
mediation is required
If we return to the capitalist division of labour, what is at stake in the transformation of the 
‘labourer’ (merely a moment of the commune) into a labourer is her insertion into a process of 
production that is segmented, serial, cumulative and irreversible (because oriented towards the 
product): the present being merely a transition from before to after^’. It is a process that is strictly 
subordinated to the measure of time, that is controlled by watches and clocks, diaries and 
calendars The time of capitalism is the time of the hour, the minute and the second, even the 
micro-second (time is money!); it is the time of homogenous time, o f multiple and parallel 
operations inscribed into a single movement that stubbornly progresses towards the future. Now, 
when for whatever contingent reason, including democratic victories won against the state, the 
division of labour cannot be reproduced according to a colonial and/or repressive state 
mediation, when all workers, that is, are formally national subjects, even national citizens 
(endowed, that is, with certain rights) they must present themselves for work already auto- 
animated in homogenous time; that is, already as individuals. In other words, labourers, 
including employees, managers and so on must live (not just represent) their lives according to 
this mode of being-in-the-world: as individuals whose present is merely a transition to the future, 
whose childhood, education, work and so on are progressive steps in an evolving movement 
towards a climax - the American dream, for example, or its South African equivalents Note, 
living in homogenous time does not mean simply desiring certain material goods (it is not being- 
a-criminal-in-the world, for example) but is living according to what Max Weber called a certain 
spirit, or an ethic: the valorisation of this working towards something in itself
We can say finally that the capitalist labourer is the national subject endowed with what 1 have 
called a national Ethnicity It is a being that appears in the sovereign light o f the national state Or 
put differently, the national state is the capitalist state /Kir excellence, provided we do not mean 
that state controlled by the capitalist class (which is not, strictly speaking, a class) but simply that 
state that produces individuals. We can say too, therefore, that the condition of the individual is 
the hegemony of the national state in its territory and the insertion of people into relations that 
hail them as such. Now, if this is true then we need ask what institutions, what state practices 
invest people with this national Ethnicity, this being-in-homogenous-time ? How, in other words, 
are people produced as individuals?
3. The Production of Homogenous Time
Foucault analysed this process o f individualisation through what he called the “disciplines”, the 
sciences and the practices o f power inherent in the prison, the clinic and so on; an approach he 
designated under the term “normalisation”’* We need not dwell here on these studies, merely to 
note the process o f individualisation that they observe. What for our purposes is more instructive 
is a study conducted by Pierre Bourdieu and Abdelmalek Sayad in Algeria. It concerns the social 
effects o f French colonial policy during the 1950’s; and in particular, the effects of 
regroupement, o f forcing Algerian peasant farmers from their lands and assembling them in 
military-run camps. Now, the example is useful not because I want to establish a relation 
between French colonialism and South African nationalism, but because the spatial structure of 
these camps will not be found unfamiliar by South African politicians, bureaucrats and
0 development workers What their study permits us to understand is how a certain layout structure, a certain town planning, is informed by and is intended to produce a certain being-in- 
the-world, a certain being-individual-in-the-world.
The policy of Regroupement proceeded according to two imperatives: a military concern to 
combat the FLN by controlling a civilian population that hid, fed and generally aided guerilla 
fighters opposed to colonial rule and a social-political imperative to radically remake Algerian
society. The authors comment:
"Tlie action of tiiose rcsponsable was inspired by die inlcnlion, iinplicil or explicit, to “evolve" die Algerian 
populations towards western social stmctiiies and altitudes: lioni clan unities or genealogically based rainilies dicy 
intended to substitute villages, from extended families, composed of several generadons living togedier, they 
intended to substitute the household in the westeni sense” (iinc)
Which begs the question: what was the colonial interest in “evolving” the Algerian extended 
household towards something that resembled the European nuclear family? The answer in it’s 
most clear and most brutal form is given to us by a French colonel at the time:
"Essentially, in effect, it is to group these people who are everywhere and who are nowhere, the essenUal is dial we 
control diem”'"’."
In short, cultural transformation was intended to make Algerians governable Extracting them 
from their extended genealogies and inserting them into familial relations resembling those of the 
European rendered them comprehensible to state apparatuses. This imperative was principal. 
Making available to capitalist agricultural production lands occupied and cultivated by subsistent 
farmers and propelling into wage labour populations living outside the cash-nexus depended on 
colonial mastery of the Algerian family This was not the case in British colonies because, 
exercising their authority indirectly, that is, through indigenous social-political structures, local 
populations needed only be immediately comprehensible to apparatuses already overdetermined 
by native society It was for this reason that it was not essential that, for the most part, colonised 
subjects spoke English nor conducted themselves as English-men. But in Algeria, the colonial 
state, especially during the war, exercised power directly through Us apparatuses, requiring, 
therefore, that Algerians be arranged and held in relations intelligible to them. It required, in 
other words, that they be marked and organised according to the categories o f the state’s social 
taxonomy Or rather, that the state tiy to insert them into such roles and functions For our
' "L’aclion des rcsponsables s’inspirait de I’inlention, iinplicite ou explicite, de “faire ^voluer les populations 
algeriennes vers des stniclures sociales et des altitudes de type occidental; i  I’unile clanique ou familialc i  base 
genealogique, on enlendail substilucr I’unile villageoise, a base spatiale, a la fainille diendue, coinposec de 
plusieurs generations vivani en indivision, Ic menage au sens occidental"
" “L’essenliel est, en cffel, de grouper ce peuple qui esi partoul et qui n’esi nulle part, I’essenliel est de nous le 
rendre saisissable
purposes what is important to note is that the making o f Algerians into Europeans was sought 
through the organisation o f space and time.
In their interviews with Algerien respondents forcibly removed from their lands and resettled in 
army-controlled compounds during the I950’s, Bordieu and Sayad note the following. Despite 
the fact that all regroupemenl camps recorded similar levels o f general unemployment (72% in 
Barbacha, 69,3% in Am-Aghbel, 66,3% in Kerkera, 77,1% in Matmata and 77,3% in Djebabra) 
interviewees described this state of inactivity in one of two ways
"One can notice that two subjects liaving identical ocaipations (in their nature and in their duration) defined 
differently what they took to be authentic work. Do we not observe, for example, tliat despite similar levels of 
employment, the rural inliabitants of the sUates of Kabyles voluntarily declared themselves unemployed if they 
judged their activity insufficient, whilst the fanners and shepherds of the South of Algeria said, ratlier, tliat tliey 
were busy^'”(imc)'.
This terminological distinction (between unemployed and busy) corresponded, moreover, to a 
certain attitude and behaviour vis-a-vis their lands. Amongst some a dogged perseverance to 
cultivate their fields despite the odds, and in others, the abandon of farming. Why, they ask, did 
similar objective constraints -  the distance of camps from agricultural fields, the reduction of the 
working day by curfews, the constant harassment o f Algerians by French officers monitoring 
exit and entrance to compounds, the dangers o f attack and arrest and blackmail from soldiers -  
produce such radically different responses. If the dangers to which Algerian peasants were 
exposed do not begin to explain their respective reactions to forced removal, neither can one 
notice corresponding social changes prior to regroupemenl, in the one group as opposed to the 
other The authors observe that amongst the people of Beni-Bellit, those resettled at Ain-Aghbel 
ceased the cultivation of their fields whereas those interned at Cheraia persevered, despite the 
greatest ad ve r s i t yW ha t  accounts for the difference, they explain, was the structure of the 
camps into which these peasants were respectively interned; or to be more precise the degree to 
which these camps conformed to the following model: Officers started by “disciplining the 
space” according to (1) geometric principles. Everything was uniformly aligned according to a 
grid that arranged houses along roads that, in turn, sketched the plan o f a Roman Castrum 
Small, extended families, strongly integrated and dispersed relative to their neighb hours found 
themselves (2) densely congregated in areas that (3) accommodated groups from different areas 
and (4) separated into nuclear-family units In addition, Bourdeau and Sayad describe how daily 
life was strictly organised according to the clock: families had to rise at a certain hour, workers 
had to assemble at another, work for so long etc.
It is not necessary to follow their analysis any further other than to note their conclusion: the 
organisation of Algerian peasants in a spatial matrix disciplined according to geometric 
principles and a temporal order measured by the clock, the break-up o f extended families into 
nuclear units and the assembly of people of different origins in the same place worked, 
essentially, to weaken and even break traditional family solidarities and to produce, in varying 
degrees, individuals that conducted themselves as labourers, what Bourdeau and Sayad call 
“sous-proletaires” or lumpen proletarians'’"'. It served, in other words, to disorganise and 
eventually dissolve the communal relation that mediated between the peasant ‘labourer’ and tbe
' '‘On pent en effet concevoir que deux sujets ayani des occupations idenliques (dans Icur nature et dans leur 
duree) fassent des declarations differcutes. selou qu'ils Ics ticuucut ou non pour travail autliciiliqiie N’obscr\c-t* 
on pas. par exeinple que. pour des taux d'occiipation rcellc tres voisins. Ics niraux des slraics kab>les sc 
dcclarent volonticrs chomeurs. s’ils estiment Iciu^  activitc insurnsante. (andis que les agricuiteurs ct pastcurs du 
Sud-Algerien se disent plutot occupes
colonial state; that is, it broke the hold of the clan over the peasant to render him immediately 
graspable by the colonial state and available for proleterianisation
Conclusion
We can say, finally, that individuals are produced in the light o f the sovereign national state; 
where this light is a host of institutional practices that hail beings-in-homogenous time, beings 
that are released from the hold o f any other state form. The national subject, the individual, is a 
being hailed and inserted into relations (including spatial and familial) that sever their ties with 
other institutional apparatuses other than the national state; it is a being whose relations with the 
national state are unmediated, uninterrupted; who is, in other words, immediately governable 
Now, this is precisely what is lacking in customary or messianic subjects; an unmediated 
relationship to the national state. They are held in relations that are organised by other state 
practices, they are produced, in other words, not in the light o f a sovereign national state, but in 
the gaze of other institutions What makes customary subjects ungovernable, therefore, is not the 
difficulty o f formulating the terms o f a relationship between national state apparatuses and 
‘traditional’ authorities, but that these subjects are produced and reproduced in relations, 
wherever they may be, that are mediated by other apparatuses; that hail them according to 
another political logic (spatial, familial, bureaucratic)
The ‘problem’ of informal settlements, for example, o f ‘development’ in general is that 
messianic subjects are organised and organise themselves in spatial relations that are mediated by 
durable and resilient local institutions, they are situated in relations that defy state control (that 
do not allocate people an address in a home on a street, that prevent the provision of services 
according to municipal mechanisms, that are difficult to police, that are not amenable to legal- 
juridical processes and so on).
Most importantly, the mediation o f subjects by other state practices, is an obstacle to 
individualisation, is an obstacle to the production of individuals that present themselves to 
capitalist production as beings-in-homogenous time; as individuals that valorise work as an 
evolution to an American way of life!
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